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 Asking (Different) Responsibility 
Questions: Responsibility and Non- 
Resposibility in Criminal Law
ARLIE LOUGHNAN*
1. Introduction  
This article begins with an observation: the legal scholarly analysis of criminal respon-
sibility is typically assumed to encompass non-responsibility; that is, studying respon-
sibility is taken to entail the study of non-responsibility. This state of affairs reflects the 
profound influence of the legal-philosophical scholarly tradition on the study of criminal 
responsibility.1 In this tradition, criminal responsibility tends to be approached as an ab-
stract matter, with the enquiry framed in terms of rules about accountability that are in-
dexed to moral norms, that is, to responsibility in general.2 This moral-evaluative enquiry 
is singular or unified – the question implicitly guiding this scholarship is something like 
‘who is responsible under criminal law?’, or more accurately, ‘who should be responsible 
*            Faculty of Law, University of Sydney. I would like to thank Sabine Selchow, Kevin Walton, and 
Jeremy Gans and Lael Weis and the members of the Melbourne Legal Theory Workshop, 
University of Melbourne, for comments on an earlier version of this piece. Thanks also to Tatjana 
Hörnle for her encouragement, and to Louisa Vaupel for assistance in preparing the piece for 
publication. This research is supported by Australian Research Council Grant No. DE130100418, 
Responsibility in Criminal Law.
1 For critical discussion of the nature and effects of this influence, see Lacey, Institutionalising 
Responsibility: Implications for Jurisprudence 4(1) Jurisprudence (2013) 1-19; see also Loughnan, 
Historicizing Criminal Responsibility, in The New Philosophy of Criminal Law, eds. Flanders and 
Hoskins (Rowman and Littlefield 2016) pp. 133-151.
2 See e.g. Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Hart 2007); 
Gardner, The Mark of Responsibility, 23(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2003) pp. 157-171; 
Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford University 
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under criminal law?’. It is this question that generates a focus on the minimum condi-
tions or capacities (moral, cognitive and volitional) an individual must have to be held 
responsible via criminal processes.3 In turn this produces a picture of responsibility and 
non-responsibility as different sides of the same coin, or, put another way, as alternative 
outcomes of the same moral-evaluative enquiry of calling individuals to account for their 
criminal conduct – in effect, as responsibility and a-responsibility.          
Despite the richness of the legal-philosophical scholarly tradition, it tends to obscure 
significant dimensions of criminal responsibility. As a number of critical criminal re-
sponsibility scholars argue, criminal responsibility must be understood as a set of blam-
ing practices that takes place in a (criminal) institutional context.4 On this approach, 
criminal responsibility is not a ‘thin’ or abstract product of certain rules or moral norms, 
but a social practice or a ‘thick’ legal ‘thing’, the product of a network of laws, process-
es, institutions and actors.5 This approach generates a different responsibility question 
– rather than ‘who is responsible under criminal law?’, the question becomes ‘in what 
ways are individuals held responsible under criminal law?’ – and this opens the way for 
multiple responses, or responses which vary from one part of the law to the other (and 
over time). As Nicola Lacey argues, this sort of approach involves asking not just what 
criminal responsibility ‘is’, but what it is ‘for’ – an enquiry that exposes its centrality to 
criminal law as a system of regulation.6 Approaching criminal responsibility this way 
extends the scholarly lens beyond conceptions of criminal responsibility (the ‘nature’ of 
criminal responsibility), to include responsibility ascription practices and the wider pro-
cesses (such as evidence and proof) relating to evaluation and adjudication of individuals 
under criminal law.
On this approach to the study of criminal responsibility, it becomes clear that the 
operative assumption that responsibility and non-responsibility are alternative outcomes 
of the same kind of abstract moral-evaluative inquiry presents a rather slanted picture. 
A close assessment of criminal responsibility practices reveals that, in broad terms, re-
sponsibility and non-responsibility look different. By examining four dimensions of 
these practices – the bases for ascription of criminal responsibility and non-responsibil-
ity, attendant rules of evidence and procedure, the temporal logics of responsibility and 
non-responsibility, and what I call the effects of ascriptions of responsibility and non-re-
3 Lacey, Responsibility and Modernity in Criminal Law, 9(3) Journal of Political Philosophy (2001) 
pp. 249-276, at 255.
4 See e.g. Farmer, The Making of the Modern Criminal Law: Criminalization and the Civil Order 
(Oxford University Press 2016); Lacey, In Search of Criminal Responsibility: Ideas, Interests and 
Institutions (Oxford University Press 2016).
5 For accounts that adopt this ‘thick’ approach, see Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality 
(Hart Publishing 2002); Veitch, Law and Irresponsibility: On the legitimation of Human Suffering 
(Routledge 2007).
6 See Lacey 2016, p. 2.
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sponsibility – it is possible to expose what I suggest are meaningful differences between 
these practices in criminal law. These differences reveal that the relationship between 
responsibility and non-responsibility is not as straightforward as typically assumed, as 
non-responsibility does not reduce to a-responsibility. Guided by the question ‘how do 
criminal responsibility and non-responsibility practices compare?’, this article sets out 
the differences between responsibility and non-responsibility practices, and explores 
their significance for our understanding of criminal responsibility. 
In developing this sketch, I bring together disparate insights from various parts of 
criminal law scholarship and apply them to the study of responsibility practices. While 
there is a general understanding that the breakdown of the criminal law into compo-
nents indicates that different parts do different things,7 and a growing awareness of the 
significance of institutional and other aspects of criminal responsibility practices,8 the 
implications of this for our understanding of the relationship between responsibility and 
non-responsibility practices have not yet been considered. In considering these impli-
cations, this article seeks to contribute to the relatively new but vibrant critical scholar-
ship on criminal responsibility, developed by a number of scholars working within so-
cio-historical and social theory disciplinary traditions. These scholars have shown that 
responsibility practices are marked by complexity and variation, and that responsibility 
in criminal law is intimately connected to larger issues of legal and social order.9 Inspired 
by this body of work, this article unpacks the relationship between responsibility practic-
es and non-responsibility practices. This exploration opens up another line of inquiry in 
criminal responsibility scholarship, which may function as a corrective to existing schol-
arly accounts of criminal responsibility, and, in turn, contribute to the development and 
vitality of the scholarly field.   
For the purposes of comparison with responsibility practices, throughout this article, 
I draw on the law of insanity (sometimes known as mental incapacity or mental incom-
petence). Insanity (alongside infancy or non-age) is widely recognised as the pre-emi-
nent instance of non-responsibility in criminal law. As the Law Commission for England 
and Wales states, the ‘true rationale’ for the insanity defence is to deny criminal responsi-
bility (not merely to deny  mens rea).10 Thus, while insanity is typically labelled a ‘defence’ 
(language which, for convenience, I carry over into this article), insanity goes to criminal 
responsibility, rather than merely to criminal liability. As Antony Duff writes, insanity 
7 See e.g. Norrie, Crime, Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law (Butterworths 
2001); Robinson, Structure and Function in Criminal Law (Clarendon Press 1997).
8 See e.g. Duff et al., The Trial on Trial series vols. 1, 2, and 3 (Oxford University Press 2004, 2006, 
2007).
9 See e.g. Farmer 2016; Lacey 2016.
10 See Law Commission for England and Wales, Insanity and Automatism: A Scoping Paper, July 
2012, para. 2.73.
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concerns an individual’s ‘capacity both to respond to reasons and then to answer [for him 
or herself]’.11 In normative terms, individuals raising insanity are claiming to be exempt 
from, or beyond the reach of, the criminal law, understood as a system of moral-legal 
condemnation and sanction. While, elsewhere, I have cautioned against an overly strict 
separation of those criminal law doctrines classed as exemptions and those classed as ex-
cuses (where each concerns mental incapacity),12 here, I confine myself to a central case 
of non-responsibility.   
In advance of the discussion of particular aspects of the insanity defence provided in 
the body of this article, a brief overview of it is appropriate. In the common law tradition, 
insanity is a general defence available across the board of criminal offences (although as 
a matter of practice, it tends to be raised only in relation to serious criminal charges13). 
As is well known, while the insanity defence is now buttressed by statutory rules, such as 
those concerning expert evidence, the test for insanity continues to be governed by the 
common law. In England and Wales, the test for insanity is provided by the M’Naghten 
Rules, formulated in response to the trial of Daniel M’Naghten, in 1843.14 The M’Naght-
en Rules comprise three limbs: they require that an individual have a ‘defect of reason’, 
resulting from a ‘disease of the mind’, and having the effect that the individual does not 
know the ‘nature and quality’ of his or her act, or that it was wrong.15 As the language 
of these three limbs suggests, the insanity defence is premised on an individual’s mental 
incapacity, arising from mental disorder or disease.16 M’Naghten insanity is framed by 
distinctive rules of evidence and proof, such as that the defence must be left to the jury.17 
Where the defence is successful, it results in what is called the special verdict ‘not guilty 
by reason of insanity’. By contradistinction with an ordinary acquittal, the special verdict 
gives courts particular disposal powers (such as the power to detain an individual who is 
considered to be dangerous).
This article consists of four parts, each of which sets out one dimension of my analysis 
of the differences between responsibility and non-responsibility practices – the bases for 
the ascriptions of criminal responsibility and non-responsibility, evidence and proof, the 
temporal logics of responsibility and non-responsibility, and the effects of ascriptions 
of responsibility and non-responsibility. In each part, I draw on aspects of the law of 
11 See Duff 2007 p. 41; see also Duff, Trials and Punishments (Cambridge University Press 1986).
12 See Loughnan, Manifest Madness: Mental Incapacity in Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 
2012), ch. 2.
13 See Mackay et al., Yet More Facts about the Insanity Defence, [2006] Criminal Law Review pp. 
399-411.
14 M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 10 Cl & Fin 200; see for discussion Loughnan, M’Naughten’s Case, in 
Landmark Cases in Criminal Law, eds. Mares et al. (Hart Publishing, 2016) (forthcoming).
15 See M’Naghten’s Case; see also Bratty v Attorney-General for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386.
16 See further Mackay, Mental Condition Defences in Criminal Law (Clarendon Press 1995), ch. 2.
17 M’Naghten’s Case; R v Matheson [1958] 1 WLR 474 p. 480.
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insanity, as it applies in England and Wales, to illustrate the points being made about 
non-responsibility. My analysis exposes meaningful differences between responsibility 
and non-responsibility practices in criminal law, indicating that the relationship between 
the two is not as straightforward as typically assumed. In the conclusion, I briefly outline 
some of the implications of my analysis for the study of criminal responsibility.
2. Bases of Ascriptions of Criminal Responsibility and Non-Responsi-
bility
The first dimension of my analysis of responsibility and non-responsibility practices con-
cerns the bases of ascriptions of responsibility and non-responsibility. Here, ascription 
refers to the practice of assigning responsibility to someone or something. While ascrip-
tion practices vary across the criminal law terrain – and my analysis should not be taken 
to imply any overarching neatness – in broad terms, there are differences in the bases of 
positive and negative ascriptions of responsibility. I suggest that the paradigm case of as-
criptions of responsibility reflects what Lacey has called the ‘primarily capacity-based and 
heavily psychologised notion of mens rea’ that marks ‘the core of the late modern general 
part of the criminal law’,18 while ascriptions of non-responsibility reflect older, charac-
ter-like bases for exemption.
In the criminal law of the current era, the classic exemplar of the ascription of crim-
inal responsibility is capacity, with its hallmarks of individual agency, choice and auton-
omy. Under ‘the principle of responsibility as founded primarily in cognitive and volitional 
human capacities’, criminal fault is subjective – it depends on what the accused himself 
or herself knew, believed or intended at the time of the conduct.19 Subjectivism has had a 
profound effect on the criminal law. The adoption of subjectivism meant that the general 
principles of criminal responsibility cohered around a particular, modern ascription of 
responsibility: that ‘harmful wrongs or wrongful harms consist centrally in culpable con-
duct’.20 Subjective mental states of intention and recklessness are regarded as axiomatic of 
criminal fault and are associated with the most serious offences in the criminal calendar. 
This is significant because, in its modern form, subjective fault is regarded as a means of 
respecting freedom of action and treating individuals as moral agents.21 Subjectivism has 
also influenced scholarly thinking about the criminal law – it has been labelled the ‘most 
important intellectual influence’ on modern criminal law scholars following the positiv-
18 See Lacey 2001 p. 266.
19 See Lacey 2013 p. 6.
20 See Farmer 2016 p. 164 (emphasis added).
21 See, e.g., Ashworth and Horder, Principles of Criminal Law 7th ed. (Oxford University Press 
2013).
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ist tradition of Jeremy Bentham.22 Orientation around a central case of capacity-based 
responsibility ensures the criminal law fits with a liberal political social structure that is 
concerned with individual autonomy, freedom, and privacy.23 
Although representing the paradigm case, capacity-based ascriptions of criminal re-
sponsibility do not cover the field. Responsibility ascription practices are marked by vari-
ability and nuance across the terrain of criminal law. The most developed assessment of 
this issue is offered by Lacey who proposes a two-fold account (conceptual and historical) 
of dynamism in criminal responsibility ascription practices.24 In the conceptual strand 
of her analysis, Lacey argues that ‘multiple and philosophically variegated’ conceptions 
of responsibility are operating in the criminal law at any one time.25 For Lacey, there are 
three main concepts or principles of responsibility attribution operative across criminal 
law. These are: capacity (which stands for concern with agency, choice and individual au-
tonomy), outcome (which concerns the social harms produced by crime), and character 
(which entails an ‘evaluation or estimation of the quality of the defendant’s (manifested or 
assumed) disposition as distinct from his or her conduct’).26 In her most recent work on this 
topic, Lacey includes risk as a fourth ‘pattern of responsibility-attribution’. Risk features 
in practices of preventive criminalisation that are particularly prominent in the current 
era.27 In the historical strand of her analysis, Lacey makes the case for significant change 
over time in criminal responsibility ascription practices, with, in broad terms, ideas of re-
sponsibility ‘as founded in character’ gradually giving way to ‘conceptions of responsibility 
as founded in capacity’ over the last two centuries.28
In relation to positive ascriptions of responsibility, a significant change is currently 
underway, as pre-modern, character-based conceptions of (positive ascriptions of) crim-
inal responsibility are enjoying a resurgence in the current era. Lacey sees this trend as 
22 Horder, Criminal Law in Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies eds. Cane and Tushnet (Oxford 
University Press 2003) pp. 226-249, at 230. On Bentham generally, see Postema, Bentham and 
the Common Law Tradition (Clarendon Press, 1986) and Lobban, The Common Law and English 
Jurisprudence 1760-1850 (Clarendon Press 1991) ch. 5.
23 See for discussion Harel, The Triadic Relational Structure of Responsibility: A Defence in Crime, 
Punishment and Responsibility: The Jurisprudence of Antony Duff, eds. Cruft et al. (Oxford 
University Press 2011) pp. 103-122.
24 See Lacey 2001 pp. 249-276, at 249; Lacey, Space, Time and Function: Intersecting Principles of 
Responsibility Across the Terrain of Criminal Justice, 1(2) Criminal Law and Philosophy (2007) 
pp. 233-250. For an explanation of the relationship between these two parts of her account, see 
Lacey, In Search of Criminal Responsibility ch. 1. 
25 Ibid p. 235.
26 See Lacey, The Resurgence of Character: Responsibility in the Context of Criminalization in 
Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law, eds. Duff and Green (Oxford University Press 2011) 
pp. 151-178, at 153-155; see also Lacey 2007 and Lacey 2016  ch. 1.
27 See Lacey 2016 ch. 2.
28 Lacey 2001 pp. 249-276, at 250, 268.
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demonstrating the changing coordination and legitimation requirements of the criminal 
law, and the influence of social, political and economic dynamics on criminal responsi-
bility practices.29 Character-based responsibility ascription practices center on how con-
duct reflects back on the individual as an individual, and it is this reflection that is central 
to determining criminal responsibility. Counter-terrorism offences, which are mush-
rooming in many common law jurisdictions, are prominent examples of the renewed 
relevance of character to criminal responsibility (although, as Lacey notes, such offences 
also implicate risk as a basis for responsibility attribution).30 Counter-terrorism offences 
may involve considerations of an individual’s motives for conduct (something which is 
traditionally eschewed in criminal law in favour of intention), revealing that what is be-
ing evaluated is disposition or attitude, rather than intention as such.31 As Lacey argues, 
character-like responsibility produces a distinct formulation of the adjudication ques-
tion: did the defendant’s conduct ‘express a settled disposition of hostility or indifference to 
the relevant norm of criminal law, or at least acceptance of such a disposition?’.32
Negative ascriptions of responsibility (non-responsibility) are generally regarded as 
being based on capacity. The preeminent instance of non-responsibility – insanity – is 
almost always assumed – by lawyers, judges and criminal responsibility scholars alike 
– to be a clear-cut case of capacity-based non-responsibility. This reflects a largely un-
questioned belief that the terrain of mental incapacity in criminal law should constitute 
‘the most fully developed aspect of the ‘inner’ or ‘psychological’ model of criminal responsi-
bility’.33 On the level of the positive law, the M’Naghten test for insanity is shot through 
with language of (in)capacity – in particular in the requirements that an individual must 
have a ‘defect of reason’ resulting from a ‘disease of the mind’.34 In case law on the insanity 
defence, it becomes apparent that M’Naghten insanity correlates with ‘major mental dis-
orders’, or ‘any mental disorder which has manifested itself in violence and which is prone 
to recur’35 – clearly and strongly connecting the defence with impairment and disability. 
The notion of incapacity also suffuses scholarly analysis of insanity as non-responsibility. 
As Duff argues, the insanity plea operates to exempt those individuals who are not prop-
erly thought of as agents because they are not able to exercise a genuine choice in acting, 
29 See Lacey 2007.
30 See Lacey 2016 pp. 147-148. See also Lacey 2016. 
31 See e.g. Lacey 2011 pp. 151-178, at 169-174. These types of offences are dependent on the 
development of particular technologies, and mass data, which generate population-scale rather 
than individual and individualised knowledge about defendants. On anti-terrorism offences 
generally, Tadros, Crimes and Security, 71(6) The Modern Law Review (2008) pp. 940-970. 
32 See Lacey 2007 pp. 233-250, at 239.  
33 See Lacey 2016.
34 M’Naghten’s Case. 
35 Bratty v Attorney-General for Northern Ireland (Lord Denning).
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or because they lack certain minimum capacities.36 Similarly, in Eric Colvin’s words, ‘the 
insanity defence rules identify special mental conditions under which persons cannot be 
expected to ensure that their conduct conforms to the requirements of law’.37 And, again, 
according to John Gardner, while other defences are about the defendant’s fitness for his 
or her role, defences such as insanity (and infancy) are straightforwardly about capacity. 38
Despite the prominence of the language of incapacity, however, ascriptions of non-re-
sponsibility via insanity bear a strong imprint of character. I suggest that the ascription 
of non-responsibility via insanity is character-like. I have developed an argument to this 
effect in full elsewhere.39 Based on a systematic study of doctrines and practices of mental 
incapacity in criminal law (a category which, on my analysis encompasses exemption and 
exculpation on the basis of mental incapacity but extends beyond it, to include procedur-
al doctrines like unfitness to plead), I developed a synthesised analysis of the terrain of 
mental incapacity in criminal law. Looking across this terrain, I suggested that the con-
struction of ‘madness’ at the point of intersection with crime shares features with char-
acter-based conceptions of responsibility: ‘madness’ is constructed as both dispositional 
and able to be ‘read’ off an individual’s conduct by different participants in the criminal 
justice process. My analysis of mental incapacity in criminal law revealed the subsisting 
significance of older ideas about the means by which certain types of human behaviour 
are evaluated, and the confidence with which evaluative judgments are made, in the op-
eration of legal doctrines and practices. In relation to ascriptions of non-responsibility 
via the insanity defence, this reflects the particular ways of being and knowing that in-
form exemption practices (and colour exculpation and other allied criminal law practices 
based on mental incapacity).
It is useful to look closely at the insanity defence to illustrate this point. My point 
about the basis of ascriptions of non-responsibility via insanity may be explicated by 
reference to the sine qua non of the defence – mental disorder or disease. I suggest that 
the disease requirement of the insanity defence reveals the character-like basis of exemp-
tion via insanity. Disease is at the heart of the insanity defence.40 As mentioned above, 
the M’Naghten Rules stipulate that exemption via the insanity defence requires that the 
36 See Duff, Choice, Character and Criminal Liability, 12 Law and Philosophy (1993) pp. 345-383, 
at 351-352, 356-57.
37 Colvin, Exculpatory Defences in Criminal Law, 10 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (1990) pp. 
381-407, at 392.
38 See Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, 2(1) Buffalo Criminal Law Review (1997) pp. 575-598, at 589.
39 See Loughnan 2012, ch. 3.
40 As a matter of the historical development of the law, the difference encoded by exculpatory 
insanity was gradually specified and medicalised to coalesce on disease: see Loughnan 2012, ch. 
5.
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defendant suffer from a disease, and specifically, a ‘disease of the mind’.41 Disease has 
a dispositional quality that dovetails with the holistic assessment of responsibility en-
tailed in character-like conceptions of criminal responsibility. Reflecting its origins in the 
realm of sciences of the body, the concept of a disease is something that has a global (or 
potentially global) impact on an individual, stretching out in time and space.42 In part 
because of the ontological features of disease – as pathology affecting a qualitative change 
on an individual – and in part as a result of the role played by expert medical evidence 
(which I discuss in the next section), the insanity defence is sometimes said to involve 
determination of the defendant’s status rather than his or her capacity. As scholars like 
Michael Moore argue, insanity is properly understood as a ‘status excuse’, in that exemp-
tion depends on the ‘accused’s general status [as a non-rational person]’, not ‘the state of 
his mind at the time he acted’.43 As this suggests, in broad contrast with the paradigm case 
of (positive) ascriptions of responsibility, as an ascription of non-responsibility, insanity 
involves character-like bases for exemption.
Criminal responsibility scholars have not fully appreciated the significance of the dis-
ease requirement for ascriptions of non-responsibility. The disease requirement of the 
insanity defence, together with the requirement that the defendant also suffer from a 
‘defect of reason’,44 is sometimes assumed to relate only to the (limited) scope, rather than 
the basis, of insanity. For some scholars, this feature of insanity reduces to a demand that 
any claim to exemption be proved or supported, that is, in effect to the suggestion that the 
disease requirement has mere evidentiary significance.45 As Mark Kelman writes, the role 
of `hard science´ in the insanity defence has meant that disease is ‘more concrete, more 
41 In addition to being of a certain kind (a ‘disease of the mind’), the relevant disease must exist 
for sufficient duration (or to a certain intensity) to be able to be proved via (expert medical) 
evidence, even if it only affects the defendant momentarily (or episodically): see R v Kemp 
[1957] 1 QB 399; R v Sullivan [1984] 1 AC 156.
42 There is an enormous philosophical literature on the notion of disease: see e.g. Fulford, The 
Concept of Disease, in Psychiatric Ethics (2nd ed.) eds. Bloch and Chodoff (Oxford University 
Press 1991) pp. 77-99; Margolis, The Concept of Disease, 1(3) The Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy (1976) pp. 238-255.
43 Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 California Law Review (1985) pp. 1091-1149, at 
1098. For Moore, the ‘language of mistake’ adopted in M’Naghten has prompted a scholarly 
misunderstanding of insanity as a ‘true excuse’, one that focuses on particular actions at the time 
of the offence (ibid., pp. 1138, 1097).
44 This requirement of M’Naghten insanity limits the defence to individuals with cognitive defects, 
excluding those with disorders of emotion or volition (control or impulse): see R v Kemp.
45 See e.g. Duff 2007 p. 286. For Duff, someone with a ‘serious, all-embracing disorder or deficiency’ 
is the ‘clearest’ example of a person ‘incapable of functioning as a rational agent’ (ibid.). See also 
Duff, Incapacity and Insanity: Do we need the Insanity Defence? in Mental Condition Defences 
and the Criminal Justice System, eds. Livings et al. (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015) 
pp.159-177.
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thing-like’ than other explanations for deviance.46 Other scholars regard this feature of 
the defence as a contingent product of the orientation of the defence around a particular 
cause of disability – an instance of what Paul Robinson calls a ‘disability organised system 
of excuses’.47 These analyses fail to grasp the deep significance of disease for non-respon-
sibility on the basis of insanity: disease is not just evidence that there are grounds for 
an exemption in a particular case, or one of a broad set of excuses pertaining to either 
the defendant or his or her circumstances. Rather, its significance is that it points to the 
basis on which individuals are exempt via insanity – the disease requirement reveals that 
the basis of the ascription of non-responsibility via insanity lies in character, rather than 
capacity.  
3. Evidence and Proof of Responsibility and Non-Responsibility
The second dimension of my analysis of responsibility and non-responsibility practices 
concerns evidence and proof. Preoccupation with the ‘nature’ of responsibility has meant 
that rules of evidence and proof governing responsibility and non-responsibility have 
been almost wholly marginalised in the scholarship on criminal responsibility. In recent 
years, however, there has been a growing recognition of the significance of these rules 
for the operation of criminal law principles such as criminal responsibility.48 When the 
rules of evidence and the burdens of proof attending responsibility and non-responsibil-
ity practices are compared, three main points of difference between these sets of practic-
es become apparent, indicating that non-responsibility has a distinctive evidentiary and 
procedural frame in criminal law.
The first point of difference between evidence and proof of responsibility and non-re-
sponsibility is the existence of the presumption of responsibility: individual responsibility 
is assumed as well as required in criminal law, and, because responsibility is assumed, 
non-responsibility must be proved. Sometimes dismissed as a by-product of the need 
for some division of labour between prosecution and defence in the courtroom, the pre-
sumption of responsibility structures proof practices.49 Responsibility has a status quo 
character – unless the issue of the defendant’s non-responsibility is raised at trial, his 
46 Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 Stanford Law Review 
(1980-1981) pp. 591-673, at 648.
47 See Robinson 1997 p. 92.
48 See Duff et al. 2004, 2006 and 2007.
49 Presumptions are generally thought to be rules of law (rather than rules of evidence) (see 
Ho, A Philosophy of Evidence Law (Oxford University Press 2008) p. 97), but a presumption 
indicates that there are good grounds for believing a particular claim (although these grounds 
are somewhat incomplete): see Hall, Presuming, 11 The Philosophical Quarterly (1961) pp. 10-
21.
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or her responsibility will not be addressed as a matter of course. In the criminal law of 
England and Wales, this is expressed in the ‘presumption of sanity’.50 When a question is 
raised about an individual’s criminal responsibility, as a matter of practice, the question 
for the court is whether he or she is non-responsible – not whether he or she is respon-
sible. Thus, while it might be a convenient scholarly shorthand to ask if an individual is 
responsible (‘who is responsible under criminal law?’), the question being asked is ‘is this 
individual non-responsible?’, and these questions differ from each other. The form the re-
sponsibility question takes reveals the assumption of individual responsibility, exposing 
the way in which the dice are loaded in favour of criminal responsibility.
The significance of the presumption of responsibility lies in its effects: the presump-
tion of responsibility means that responsibility is unexceptional and non-responsibility 
is exceptional. It is in the presumption of responsibility (as the ‘presumption of sanity’) 
that the abstract reasoning individual of criminal legal theory takes form. As a number 
of scholars suggest, this abstract, reasoning individual has come to stand at the centre of 
criminal law principles and processes such as the criminal trial. In Alan Norrie’s words, 
this reasoning individual has become a ‘powerful mechanism of ideological legitimation’ 
for the criminal law.51 In addition to being autonomous and rational, the subject of the 
criminal law is ‘always accountable’.52 This must be seen to be a politically charged as well 
as contingent situation. As Lindsay Farmer argues, it is in the modern period that indi-
vidual responsibility has come to be regarded as central to the conceptual order and the 
self-understanding of the criminal law.53 This is expressed through the idea that respon-
sibility can act as a constraint on criminalisation via mens rea. However, Farmer argues 
that criminal responsibility was not in fact foundational to the modern law because of 
an intrinsic connection between wrongdoing and fault: the fact that it is thought to be 
so reflects the way individual responsibility is part of the modality of law, the way civil 
order is secured.54 This modality or civil order rests on the generalisability of the juridical 
person – a person who can self-regulate and self-reflect, appreciate the importance of 
general norms of conduct for self and others, and develop his or her interests and identity 
over time – as the modern subject.55
The second point of difference between evidence and proof of responsibility and 
non-responsibility relates to the kind of relationship that exists between an individual 
50 M’Naghten’s Case.
51 See Norrie 2001 p.176. This is the ‘juridical subject’, in Norrie’s words: see ibid. pp. 16-24 for 
discussion.
52 Rabin, Identity, Crime and Legal Responsibility in Eighteenth Century England (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2004) p. 110.
53 See Farmer 2016 ch. 6.
54 Ibid p. 165.
55 Ibid p. 168.
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and the explanation he or she has for engaging in criminal conduct. This kind of relation-
ship differs for responsibility practices compared with non-responsibility practices: in re-
lation to their explanations for conduct, defendants denying responsibility are positioned 
differently to those defendants not denying responsibility. This point can be grasped by 
reference to the legal-philosophical practice of organising defences along normative 
lines, into justifications (such as self defence) and excuses (such as duress), on the one 
hand, and denials of responsibility, on the other hand.56 Justifications and excuses con-
stitute arguments that go to liability, while denials of responsibility go to responsibility. 
As Jeremy Horder argues, the ‘moral relationship’ between the defendant and the reasons 
he or she provides for criminal conduct differ between these cases.57 Horder develops 
a schema of defences categorised according to reasons for conduct, or explanations for 
engaging in wrongdoing.58 A defendant raising a justification or excuse is constructed as 
‘morally active’: it is he or she who makes the defence. By contrast, a defendant making a 
denial of responsibility (a plea for an exemption) is constructed as ‘morally passive’: such 
a denial is not genuinely made by the defendant, but granted or awarded to him or her.59 
As this indicates, non-responsibility practices position the defendant differently vis-à-vis 
his or her reasons for conduct – as passive as opposed to active – when compared with 
responsibility practices. 
This connects with the third point of difference between evidence and proof of respon-
sibility and non-responsibility, which concerns the types of knowledge that are brought 
to bear in assessing responsibility (that is, determining if an individual is non-responsi-
ble). Flowing both from its status quo character, and reflecting its centrality to criminal 
law evaluation and adjudication practices in general, responsibility is treated as generally 
‘knowable’. This means that it is the subject of general or common knowledge – lay people 
are competent to identify and evaluate it, and there is no need for additional informa-
tional resources to be enlisted in the process of determining (that is, assuming) responsi-
bility. By contrast, reflecting (and reinforcing) its exceptional nature, non-responsibility 
requires expert knowledge. This expert knowledge, adduced at trial in the form of expert 
evidence, buttresses claims to exemption. The rationale for relying on expert evidence 
to assess non-responsibility is that it addresses matters lying beyond the competence of 
56 This classificatory schema is a feature of several legal-philosophical analyses of criminal law: see 
e.g. Husak, The serial view of criminal law defenses, 3(3) Criminal Law Forum (1992) pp. 369-
400.
57 See Horder, Excusing Crime (Oxford University Press 2004) pp. 103-108.
58 Horder distinguishes between ‘excusatory claims’, ‘diminished capacity claims’ (by which he refers 
to something other than the extant partial defence of diminished responsibility), and ‘denials 
of responsibility’, arguing that these correspond to reasons with respect to which defendants 
are morally active, mixed reasons for conduct where defendants are both morally active and 
morally passive, and reasons for conduct with respect to which the defendant is morally passive, 
respectively: see ibid pp. 103-108.
59 See ibid pp. 103-08; see also Duff 2007 pp. 286-287.
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ordinary people (in the form of the jury) to evaluate. In the language adopted by Duff 
as part of his broader argument about responsibility as ‘answerability’, denials of respon-
sibility (or ‘agent exemptions’) implicate someone other than the defendant: it falls to a 
‘third party’ – not the defendant him or herself – to make the case for an exemption.60 
Two aspects of the distinctive evidentiary and procedural framework of M’Naghten 
insanity illustrate this part of my analysis. The first aspect relevant here is the burden of 
proof. Uniquely in the common law of crime, the M’Naghten Rules place a substantive or 
legal burden on the defendant to prove insanity (the reverse burden of proof). This means 
that, unless the prosecution raises insanity because the defendant has put his or her men-
tal state in issue (by raising the defence of diminished responsibility, for instance), the 
defence must prove the defendant’s insanity to the balance of probabilities standard.61 The 
defence must prove non-responsibility, or, as the House of Lords stated in Woolmington, 
in insanity, ‘it is incumbent upon the accused to prove his innocence’.62 The explanation for 
the reverse burden of proof in insanity is complex and multi-layered,63 but the point here 
can be stated simply: non-responsibility on the basis of insanity is so exceptional that 
even the presumption of innocence – which has come to be known as the ‘golden thread’ 
of the common law of crime64 – does not apply to it. As an aspect of the evidentiary and 
procedural frame of insanity, the reverse burden of proof encodes the exceptionality of 
non-responsibility.
The second aspect of the evidentiary and procedural framework of insanity which 
is relevant here is the rule mandating expert evidence in support of the plea of insanity. 
As mentioned above, the M’Naghten Rules stipulate that the insanity defence must be 
left to the jury,65 but in recent decades, in England and Wales, statutory provisions have 
been introduced that require expert evidence to support any insanity plea. The Criminal 
Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991 introduced a requirement that no 
jury is entitled to find insanity without evidence from two or more registered medical 
60 See ibid pp. 286-287; see also Baron, Excuses Excuses, 1(1) Criminal Law and Philosophy (2007) 
pp. 21-39.
61 R v Soderman (1935) AC 462; R v Carr-Briant [1943] KB 607. If the defendant raises diminished 
responsibility, the prosecution is entitled to raise evidence tending to prove insanity: see Criminal 
Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 (England and Wales), s 6.
62 Woolmington v DPP [1935] All ER 1, p. 8.
63 George Fletcher argues that the reverse burden is a reflection of the criminal law’s debt to ‘private 
litigation’, the civil (as opposed to criminal) law): see Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A 
Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 Yale Law Journal 
(1968) pp. 880-935, at 917; see also Loughnan 2012 pp. 163-165.
64 The idea of the presumption of innocence as the ‘golden thread’ running through the criminal 
law dates from Woolmington v DPP. 
65 M’Naghten’s Case; R v Matheson p. 480.
38
Arlie Loughnan
practitioners.66 As I have suggested elsewhere, by the time of the passage of the 1991 Act, 
expert evidence was essential to the legitimacy of the insanity plea, and the particular 
knowledge mix governing evaluations and adjudications of insanity – lay and expert – 
had become a familiar feature of the criminal law on mental incapacity.67 For my purpos-
es here, the relevant point is that this rule mandates that others make a case on behalf of 
the insane defendant:  by contrast with excuses (which do not deny responsibility), where 
the defendant answers for him or herself, ‘in the first person’, as an agent,68 a ‘third party’ 
is necessarily involved in responding to the criminal charge. This rule about expert evi-
dence for insanity exemplifies one of the differences between responsibility and non-re-
sponsibility practices in the criminal law.
4. The Temporal Logics of Responsibility and Non-Responsibility
Criminal law rests on particular relations between time, space, individuals and objects: 
that is, criminal law doctrines and practices encode particular temporal and spatial log-
ics. Temporal and spatial logics are central to the enforcement of proscribed conduct 
and the definitions of crime (although they have been thought of as part of procedur-
al rather than substantive law).69 According to Mark Kelman, who first introduced the 
‘time-framing’ construct into criminal law scholarship, ‘we neither frame time the same 
way in all criminal law settings nor do we explain why we use one time frame or another’.70 
As I discuss in this section, criminal responsibility and non-responsibility practices differ 
in their respective temporal logics: while ascriptions of criminal responsibility rely on 
a ‘snapshot’ timeframe, non-responsibility depends on an extended, or ‘long exposure’, 
timeframe.  
Positive ascriptions of criminal responsibility rest on a ‘snapshot’ view of the relevant 
time. This is generally the moment of the coincidence of the actus reus of the alleged 
offence and the mens rea required by the offence.71 It is because of the ‘snapshot’ time-
66 Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991 (England and Wales) s1(1). Section 
1(1) of the Act requires ‘written or oral evidence of two or more registered medical practitioners at 
least one of whom is duly certified’ before the jury may deliver a special verdict.
67 On the ongoing role of lay knowledge of mental incapacity alongside expert knowledge, see 
Loughnan, 2012, ch. 6.
68 See Duff 2007 pp. 286-287.
69 See Farmer, Time and Space in Criminal Law, 13 New Criminal Law Review (2010) pp. 333-356. 
70 See Kelman 1980-1981 pp. 591-673, at 592-593. Kelman suggests that rhetorical legal argument 
depends on ‘interpretive construction’ – a prior and implicit framing or characterisation of facts 
in issue. For Kelman, this process of framing in criminal law is ideological in that it reflects 
political considerations. See Farmer 2010, for a critical discussion of Kelman’s analysis.
71 Kelman 1980-1981 pp. 591-673 at 633; see also Williams Textbook of Criminal Law (Stevens 
1978).
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frame that motive or purpose of criminal conduct is disregarded (at least ostensibly), 
in favour of more technical and ostensibly neutral non-evaluative mental states such as 
intention.72 This ‘snapshot’ timeframe also extends to those defences that deny liability 
but not responsibility (justifications and excuses). As John Gardner writes, excuses and 
justifications are ‘putative rational explanations’ of a wrong or a mistake, and the relevant 
timeframe is the time at which the wrong or mistake was completed.73 Put another way, a 
defendant’s justifying or excusing reasons, giving rise to claims for self-defence or duress, 
for example, are closed at the completion of the offence.74 While adherence to this ‘snap-
shot’ view is sometimes honoured in the breach (as in the doctrine of a continuing act), 
it remains a cardinal (limiting) principle of criminal law. In Kelman’s words, this narrow 
time framing buttresses ‘the traditionally asserted intentionalism’ of the criminal justice 
system, the foundation of which is the principle that individual conduct is the result of 
free choice.75 
By contrast, negative ascriptions of responsibility (i.e. non-responsibility practices) 
operate with a broader or ‘long exposure’ timeframe. The longer timeframe relates to 
those cases in which responsibility is in question (‘is he or she non-responsible?’), not 
the cases in which it is assumed. As Gardner writes in relation to what he calls ‘basic re-
sponsibility’, denials of responsibility are not subject to ‘the same freeze-frame restriction’ 
that applies to positive ascriptions of responsibility.76 Rather, non-responsibility has what 
Gardner labels a diachronic or cross-temporal aspect. By this, he means that ‘in respect of 
any one action in relation to which one’s responsibility is in question, the question of whether 
one is responsible straddles the gap between the time at which the action was performed, 
and the time at which the question itself arises’.77 In a similar vein to Gardner, and, in re-
lation to non-responsibility, Victor Tadros suggests that, if the accused has suffered from 
something like a brain injury, that means that the identity of that agent qua agent cannot 
be determined simply at the point in time at which she acts – a longer timeframe is re-
quired to determine responsibility for conduct.78 The ‘long exposure’ timeframe dovetails 
with the distinctive basis of ascriptions of non-responsibility, discussed above: charac-
72 See Duff, Principle and Contradiction in the Criminal Law: Motives and Criminal Liability in 
Philosophy and the Criminal Law: Principles and Critique,, ed. Duff  (Cambridge University Press 
1998) pp. 156-204; and Horder, On the Irrelevance of Motive in Criminal Law in Oxford Essays 
on Jurisprudence Fourth Series, ed. Horder (Oxford University Press 2000)  pp.173-191. 
73 See Gardner 2003 pp. 157-171, at 157, 161.
74 See for discussion Horder 2000 pp. 173-191.
75 See Kelman 1980-1981 pp. 591-673, at 591, 600.
76 See Gardner 2003 pp. 157-171, at 157, 161.
77 Ibid pp. 157-171, at 157, 162. 
78 See Tadros 2005 p. 141.
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ter-like bases for criminal responsibility situate attribution in a broader time frame than 
that which is implied by a capacity conceptualisation of responsibility.79 
The way in which the ‘long exposure’ timeframe operates in non-responsibility is ap-
parent in the insanity defence. As mentioned above, under the M’Naghten Rules, insanity 
exempts because either an individual is unable to understand the nature and quality of 
his or her act, or because he or she cannot appreciate that it was wrong.80 As several 
commentators argue, knowledge of the wrongness of an act is not an application of the 
ordinary rules of mens rea.81 A defendant may have the mens rea for an offence, and yet, 
as a result of a ‘defect of reason’ resulting from a ‘disease of the mind’, he or she may not 
know that the act was wrong, meaning that he or she still falls within the bounds of the 
insanity defence. As a result, the insanity defence actually operates in one or other of two 
ways: it either negates an element of the offence (mens rea) or it exempts the defendant 
although he or she performed the actus reus with the requisite mens rea.82 And, if the 
latter, it functions in quite a distinctive way – over an extended time frame – reflecting 
the ‘long-exposure’ time-framing of non-responsibility practices in criminal law. Excul-
pation via M’Naghten insanity can be understood to impact on an individual in a way 
that resists the actus reus/mens rea dyad, invoking an idea of a condition stretched out in 
time – beyond the narrow slice in time corresponding with the commission of the actus 
reus. In Kelman’s terms, this reflects the triumph of ‘determinism’ in criminal defences 
such as insanity – the idea that conduct is causally connected to prior events – over the 
‘intentionalism’ dominant in other parts of the criminal law.83
Diminished responsibility serves as a useful further illustration of this point. In En-
gland and Wales, as in some other common law jurisdictions, diminished responsibil-
ity is a partial defence, which is available to murder only, and, where it is successful, 
it reduces murder to manslaughter.84 Although typically labelled a defence, diminished 
responsibility combines ‘excusatory and denial-of-responsibility elements’, and thus blurs 
the boundary between excuses and exemptions.85 That is, as with other parts of the crim-
inal law that concern mental incapacity, there are connections between diminished re-
sponsibility and the central case of exemption, insanity. One such point of connection 
relates to time-framing. As a result of the recent Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (England 
79 See Lacey 2007 pp. 233-250, at 233, 239.
80 See M’Naghten’s Case.
81 See e.g. Smith, Insanity – Available as a Defence in Summary Trials, 129 Criminal Law Review 
(1997) pp. 129-133, at 133; Ward, Magistrates, Insanity and the Common Law, Criminal Law 
Review 796 (1997) pp. 796-804, at 802.
82 See e.g. Colvin 1990 pp. 381-407, at 394; Robinson 1997 p. 86.
83 Kelman 1980-1981 pp. 591-673 at 647-649. Kelman puts the defences of duress and provocation 
in this same category. 
84 See Homicide Act 1957, s 2, as amended by Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 52.
85 See Horder 2004 pp. 107-108. 
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and Wales), the defence of diminished responsibility is available where a killing is caused 
or explained by an ‘abnormality of mental functioning’, arising from a ‘recognised medical 
condition’, which has ‘substantially impaired’ the defendant’s ‘ability’ to understand the 
nature of his or her conduct, form a rational judgment or exercise self-control, and the 
‘abnormality provides an explanation for the defendant’s act in doing or being a party to the 
killing’.86 As this language suggests, while, formally, it is the actor’s state at the moment of 
the killing that is at issue, the statutory references to ‘ability’ and ‘abnormality’ invoke a 
more status-like condition, one that is not reducible to a mere moment in time and space. 
The extended timeframe employed by the criminal law has an echo in the timeframe em-
bedded in the types of expert knowledge enlisted to support claims of non-responsibility 
(discussed above).87
5. Effects of Ascriptions of Responsibility and Non-Responsibility
The final dimension of my analysis of responsibility practices concerns the effects of as-
criptions of criminal responsibility and non-responsibility. By effects, I refer to what is 
made possible through these criminal responsibility practices. When the effects of re-
sponsibility and non-responsibility practices are examined, it becomes clear that, with 
liability achieving a moral fine-tuning of individual responsibility, positive ascriptions of 
responsibility are differentiated, while, on the other hand, ascriptions of non-responsibil-
ity are not differentiated, and leave blame or moral fault unapportioned or free floating. 
The moral fine-tuning of individual responsibility via liability separates out what are, 
in effect, degrees or, more accurately, types of responsibility, meaning that positive as-
criptions of criminal responsibility are differentiated. Responsibility and liability are dis-
tinct,88 but, in practice, they are difficult to fully or sharply separate – as Norrie argues, 
the ‘architectonic of offence (mens rea plus actus reus) and defence’ is a way of ‘doing’ 
criminal responsibility’.89 Thus, while, in its positive form, criminal responsibility appears 
as if it were neatly demarcated from blameworthiness or culpability, liability and (positive 
86  Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 52, amending Homicide Act 1957, s 2.
87 I suggest that this extended timeframe is structurally embedded in the expert medical (psychiatric 
and psychological) knowledges enlisted in adjudications of criminal non-responsibility: see 
further Loughnan 2012 ch. 6.
88 As a conceptual matter, responsibility is a pre-condition of liability: for discussion, see Duff 2007 
pp. 19-23.
89 See Norrie 2001 p. 139.
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ascriptions of) responsibility are connected.90 There are two aspects to this point, one 
concerning the elements of criminal offences, and the other concerning defences. First, 
differentiation of positive ascriptions of criminal responsibility is achieved by the differ-
ent types of mens rea or fault – intention, recklessness, knowledge and negligence – that 
apply to different criminal offences. Different types of mens rea are generally considered 
to exist in a hierarchy of levels of culpability (although, according to critical scholars, an 
imperfect one), with intention at the top, permitting a grading of the blameworthiness of 
the offender and assessment of the relative seriousness of the offence.91 Even acknowledg-
ing that factors other than mens rea work to distinguish particular offenders and offences 
from other offenders and other offences (the grading of offences is also realised by the 
degree of harm the defendant causes, for instance, assault occasioning actual bodily harm 
as opposed to assault occasioning grievous bodily harm),92 and recalling that aggravating 
and mitigating factors will vary the punishment that follows a conviction for a criminal 
offence,93 it is possible to see that moral grading via mens rea achieves a kind of variega-
tion of positive ascriptions of criminal responsibility.
The second way in which (positive ascriptions of) responsibility are differentiated 
concerns those defences that an individual may raise to avoid criminal liability, but which 
do not throw criminal responsibility into question. The moral fine-tuning of positive 
ascriptions of criminal responsibility is further enhanced if one takes into account these 
defences. This point can be grasped by comparing those defences classed as justifications 
or excuses (that is, defence arguments that go to liability) and denials of responsibility, a 
90 For critique of the assumption about this neat separation, see Norrie, Simulacra of Morality?: 
Beyond the Ideal/Actual Antinomies of Criminal Justice in Philosophy and the Criminal Law: 
Principle and Critique, ed. Duff (Cambridge University Press 1998) pp. 101-155. Norrie argues 
that it is not possible to bracket culpability off from responsibility, and that responsibility involves 
both being ‘called to respond’ (answerability) and being ‘found responsible’ (culpability) (ibid, 
pp. 113-114).
91 See, e.g., Moore, Intention as a Marker of Moral Culpability and Legal Punishability in 
Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law, eds. Duff and Green, (Oxford University Press 2011) 
pp. 179-205 at 184. See also Tadros 2005 ch. 8; Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability 
(Blackwell 1990). What precisely underpins such a hierarchy, and what parts are played by the 
different types of mens rea, has been the subject of significant critique: for critical discussion 
about intention and culpability, see Lacey, A Clear Concept of Intention? Elusive or Illusory?, 
56(5) Modern Law Review (1993) pp. 621-642; Norrie, Oblique Intention and Legal Politics 
[1989] Criminal Law Review pp. 793-807. See also Horder, Intention in the Criminal Law – A 
Rejoinder, 58(5) Modern Law Review pp. 678-691.
92 For discussion, see Horder, Rethinking Non-Fatal Offences against the Person 14(3) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies (1994) pp. 335-351; see also Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Oxford 
University Press 2000) on the ‘harmful consequences’ pattern of criminality.
93 According to Peter Cane, the type and severity of criminal sanctions are expressions of ‘judgments 
about degrees of responsibility’: see Cane 2002 p. 34.
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distinction discussed above.94 Unlike denials of responsibility, like insanity, justifications 
and excuses constitute ‘exculpatory answers for the commission of the offence for which 
responsibility has been proved’.95 That is, raising a justification or excuse in response to a 
criminal charge is asserting responsibility.96 As Duff writes, ‘to offer an excuse is to admit 
responsibility for an action’ and to ‘offer an exculpating answer’.97 On this view, justifica-
tions and excuses are within the realm of criminal responsibility in its positive form, and 
represent a further adjustment of (positive) ascriptions of responsibility. While critical 
scholars have debated what exactly is achieved by this demarcation of justification and 
excuse, and also what is achieved by robustly maintaining the distinction between actus 
reus/mens rea and defences,98 for my purposes here, what is clear is that the realm of 
positive ascriptions of responsibility is differentiated, finessed by liability (mens rea and 
defences).
In comparison, ascriptions of non-responsibility are not so differentiated, meaning 
that the effects of ascriptions of non-responsibility are less variegated and more open-tex-
tured, with blame or moral fault left free-floating. This point can be grasped by reflecting 
on the characteristics of exemptions. There are two aspects to this point. First, at least 
formally, non-responsibility is an either/or construction. That is, an individual is either 
a subject of the criminal law or not, someone to whom the law speaks or not, a person 
within its reach or beyond it. This reflects the traditional idea that a defendant is either 
accountable for his or her act, or not accountable at all. Unlike positive ascriptions of 
responsibility, no degrees or types of non-responsibility are formally permitted. At least 
as a conceptual matter, it is not possible for someone to be somewhat or partially account-
able.99 In Jerome Hall’s words, ‘legal adjudication and the inexorable logic of its method, 
implied in the issue whether a person does or does not fall within the reach of the prescrip-
tions, require a determination that the defendant is responsible or that he is not responsible. 
There is no other alternative’.100 This either/or, black-and-white aspect of non-responsibil-
ity does not permit shades of grey.
94 In this normative schema, justifications and excuses exist in a hierarchy, where the former are 
more preferable than the latter: see Gardner 2003 pp. 157-171 at 161; see also Gardner 1997 pp. 
575-598 at 575.
95 See Duff 2007 p. 263. See also Horder 2004 p. 105; Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75(1) California Law 
Review (1987) pp. 257-289, at 262–263.
96 See Gardner 1997 pp. 575-598, at 588 (emphasis added).
97 See Duff 2007 p. 285.
98 See Norrie 2001; see also Norrie 1998 pp. 101-155.
99 Walker, Crime and Insanity in England, Vol 1 (Edinburgh University Press 1968) p.162. This has 
generated challenges in reconciling the partial defence of diminished responsibility with legal 
principle: see Loughnan 2012, ch. 9.
100 See Hall, Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility, 57(7) Harvard Law Journal (1944) pp. 1045-
1084, at 1081.
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Second, because non-responsibility blocks liability, there is no (subsequent) grading 
of non-responsibility, and blame is left more free-floating. By contrast with proof of re-
sponsibility, which creates a presumption of liability, leaving it to the defendant to block 
the ‘normal presumptive transition’ from responsibility to liability,101 non-responsibility 
renders liability redundant. Absent liability, non-responsibility is not finely graded in 
the way of (positive) responsibility. Because the ascription of non-responsibility stops 
any enquiry into blame, in its negative form, non-responsibility, fault is unaccounted for 
or unapportioned. That is, it is not possible to make a judgment about an individual’s 
culpability. In Duff ’s terms, someone who is ‘so seriously disordered as to be non-respon-
sible’ falls ‘outside the reach of reasons’ and the ‘judgment’ of the criminal law.102 In this 
respect, exemption stands in contrast with justifications or excuses, like self-defence, for 
example, where fault is absent or eclipsed by the rightness of the defendant’s act or his 
or her reasons for it.103 The effect of ascriptions of non-responsibility is that the criminal 
legal process has failed to conclude the responsibility question relating to the offence: a 
harmful act has been done, but the individual charged with it cannot be held responsible 
for it. I return to this point in relation to the implications of my analysis in the concluding 
section of this article.
Again, drawing on the law of insanity assists in illustrating this point about the ef-
fects of ascriptions of non-responsibility (exemptions). Here, the result of a successful 
insanity defence – the special verdict – is instructive. As mentioned above, in England 
and Wales, the special verdict provides that an individual is ‘not guilty’ because of in-
sanity (‘not guilty by reason of insanity’), giving both the verdict (‘not guilty’) and the 
factual basis for it (‘insanity’).104 This formula seems to imply that the issue of blame has 
been addressed along with the issue of responsibility, that both moral and legal questions 
have been concluded. But the situation is not so neat, and we do not have to go too far 
to find other kinds of relationships between insanity and fault posited in the insanity 
defence.105 As recently as the post-war period, overt consideration of moral fault was 
101 See Duff 2007 p. 22. See also Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Clarendon Press 1968) pp. 212-
222 (where Hart distinguishes between ‘role responsibility’ and ‘legal liability-responsibility’).
102 See Duff 2007 p. 290.
103 See Fletcher, The Nature of Justification, in Action and Value in Criminal Law eds. Shute et al. 
(Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 175-186.
104 M’Naghten’s Case.
105 In England and Wales, for a period of time over the end of the 1800s and first half of the 1900s, 
the form of the special verdict was ‘guilty but insane so as not to be responsible according to law 
for his actions’. In the Trial of Lunatics Act 1883, the special verdict was repackaged as ‘guilty but 
insane’ thus technically altering its form to a conviction from an acquittal. For discussion, see 
Moran, The Origin of Insanity as a Special Verdict: The Trial for Treason of James Hadfield, 19(3) 
Law and Society Review (1985) pp. 487-521 at 519. It is only since the passage of the Criminal 
Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 that the form of the special verdict has been ‘not guilty by reason 
of insanity’: see Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964.
Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice • 1/2016
45
considered compatible with the grant of the insanity defence. The proposal presented by 
the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment in its 1953 Report recommended that a 
jury considering the insanity defence should be directed to determine whether ‘at the 
time of the act the accused was suffering from a disease of the mind (or mental deficiency) 
to such a degree that he ought not to be held responsible’.106 This reformulation of the test 
for insanity makes overt the moral-evaluative considerations entailed in granting the de-
fence, even where a relevant mental disorder exists. As Roger Smith argues, this proposal 
rested on the belief that ‘responsibility was essentially a subjective, ethical question, making 
the relationship between insanity and criminal responsibility inherently incapable of precise 
definition’.107 As this formulation of the insanity defence indicates, moral fault was not 
considered extinguished by a particular mental condition – the moral question whether 
the condition ought to be exempt is identified as a separate matter, lingering within the 
realm of non-responsibility.
6. Conclusion
This article has offered an assessment of legal scholarly analysis of responsibility and 
non-responsibility in criminal law. I explicated current scholarship on criminal responsi-
bility by reference to the kinds of questions that may be asked by responsibility scholars. 
As mentioned at the outset of the discussion, the question that has tacitly guided the 
dominant strain of criminal responsibility scholarship (informed by the legal-philosoph-
ical tradition) is something like ‘who is responsible under criminal law?’, or ‘who should 
be responsible under criminal law’. This guiding question has followed from a scholarly 
preoccupation with the ‘nature’ of responsibility. The question ‘who is responsible under 
criminal law?’ produces a picture of responsibility and non-responsibility as different 
sides of the same coin, alternative outcomes of the same moral-evaluative enquiry of 
calling individuals to account for their criminal conduct. This reduces the relationship 
between responsibility and non-responsibility to one of, in effect, responsibility and a-re-
sponsibility.
Adopting a more critical approach to criminal responsibility – understood as a set of 
practices taking place in a particular criminal institutional context – generates a differ-
ent responsibility question – ‘in what ways are individuals held responsible in criminal 
law?’. Inspired by the critical scholarship on criminal responsibility practices that asks 
different responsibility questions, this article considered the question ‘how do criminal 
responsibility and non-responsibility practices compare?’. A close examination of four 
106 United Kingdom Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1949-1953 Report (Cmd 8932, 
1953) para. 333 (emphasis added).
107 Smith, Lawyers, Legislators and Theorists: Developments in English Criminal Jurisprudence 1800–
1957 (Clarendon Press 1998), p. 327.
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dimensions of criminal responsibility and non-responsibility – ascriptions of responsi-
bility and non-responsibility, attendant rules of evidence and procedure, the temporal 
logics of responsibility and non-responsibility, and what I called the effects of ascriptions 
of responsibility and non-responsibility – revealed meaningful differences between the 
two sets of practices. My analysis suggests that criminal responsibility and non-respon-
sibility do not sit in a straightforward relationship with each other: non-responsibility is 
not a-responsibility, or simply not responsibility. By way of conclusion, I briefly mention 
two implications of my analysis.
One implication of my analysis relates to the political dimensions of non-respon-
sibility practices in criminal law. Non-responsibility practices leave a kind of political 
remainder, which is obscured in accounts that regard responsibility and non-responsi-
bility as alternative outcomes of the same moral-evaluative inquiry. As mentioned above, 
non-responsibility leaves moral fault free-floating. This free-floating moral fault means 
that the legal process has failed to conclude the responsibility questions relating to the 
offence. So, while we might argue that, in the current era, blameworthiness in criminal 
law is not supposed to be a ‘hovering wickedness’, but to attach to particular harmful 
acts,108 something like a ‘hovering wickedness’ haunts non-responsibility. When criminal 
responsibility practices are viewed in a broader context, a finding of non-responsibility 
can be seen to generate other responsibility questions. In relation to insanity, such ques-
tions may include ‘is there someone else, perhaps a negligent medical professional, or 
something else, such as a care facility without adequate safeguards in place, who/which 
bears some moral responsibility for the act committed by the defendant?’. These individ-
uals or institutions may be out of the criminal law frame, but within any moral-evaluative 
frame (and perhaps also within any civil law responsibility frame like tort). Such political 
remainders may also follow ascriptions of responsibility,109 but it seems to me that the po-
litical remainder is more prominent, and also more problematic, and in particular need 
of careful, scholarly attention, when it comes to non-responsibility.
A second implication of my analysis relates to the extant position of non-responsibil-
ity in the legal-philosophical criminal responsibility scholarly tradition. Reflecting the 
connections between legal-philosophical accounts of criminal responsibility and liberal 
political philosophy (both of which are concerned with individual autonomy, freedom 
and privacy, and with the duties owed by the individual to the polity110), the primary 
significance of a finding of non-responsibility in these accounts is normative – it marks 
108 See Kelman 1980-1981 pp. 591-673 at 633.
109 Norrie argues that individual responsibility is always intermixed with social responsibility 
for wrong-doing meaning that this would apply as much to ascriptions of responsibility as to 
ascriptions of non-responsibility: see Norrie 1998 p. 117. 
110 See e.g. Duff, Responsibility, Citizenship and Criminal Law in Philosophical Foundations of 
Criminal Law, eds. Duff and Green (Oxford University Press 2011) pp. 125-148.
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out a space where the moral-condemnatory power of the law runs out. As this suggests, 
non-responsibility represents a limit on the reach of the criminal law. As Eric Colvin 
writes regarding insanity, this defence applies to exceptional individuals, non- or less 
than full subjects of the criminal law, or improper targets of criminal sanctions, those 
for whom the ‘general law of criminal culpability is unsuited’.111 Similarly, for Duff, an 
individual who is not responsible is someone who is an ‘object’ rather than a ‘subject’ 
of the criminal law.112 In these legal-philosophical accounts of criminal responsibility, 
non-responsibility is a kind of residual category, defined by the absence of conditions 
of responsibility. But on my analysis, non-responsibility looks different to responsibility, 
meaning it is not a space that may be fully grasped merely in opposition to responsibility. 
And this gives rise to an imperative to take non-responsibility practices seriously, and to 
appreciate their distinctive features, rather than subsume them beneath a general focus 
on criminal responsibility. This article is a contribution to that endeavour.
111 See Colvin, 1990 pp. 381-407, at 402.
112 See Duff 1986 p. 122; see also Tadros 2005 pp. 55-56.
